Abstract: In this paper we construct an index of constitutional commitment to social security (CCSS) in seven areas: Old Age, Survivors, Disability, Unemployment, Sickness, Work Injury, and Income Support. We have found a positive connection between our measure of constitutional commitment to social security and the extent and coverage of actual measures of social security laws. The constitutional text of each nation seems to play a role in explaining the large variations in welfare state coverage around the world.
Introduction
The share of spending on social security varies considerably around the world. Even advanced countries exhibit significant variation in such social insurance policies as old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and work injury compensation. In 2010, Denmark spent 25.4 % of GDP (the highest) on social protection expenditures, while in South Korea (the lowest) it was only 3.8 % of GDP (OECD.stat).
The academic effort to explain this observed large difference in redistribution policy spans political science, economics and sociology. Three main theories are offered to account for the variability. According to the Power Resource approach, the cross-country variation in social policy is explained by conflict between various social groups. Countries with left-wing ruling parties and powerful labor unions tend to have a highly developed welfare state as compared to countries with rightist political parties in governing coalitions (Korpi, 1983 (Korpi, , 1989 Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hicks et al., 1995; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Bradley et al., 2003) . Alesina et al. (2001) provide a somewhat similar argument, and claim that race fragmentation or conflict is a major reason for the observed differences in welfare states between the two sides of the Atlantic. Voters will support a welfare state if they believe that low income is the result of circumstances outside the power of individuals and they will dislike redistribution if it is perceived as a consequence of lack of effort, mainly by an individual from another race.
The Logic of Industrialism, which is associated with Wilensky (1975) , is another significant approach in explaining why some countries redistribute more than others. Several studies have shown that those countries with higher GDP per capita and a larger share of elderly population account for part or most of the cross-country differences in the generosity of social programs (Hicks, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2002) .
A third approach examines the role of political institutions such as electoral systems and constitutional veto points. 1 The constitutional structure has been used quite extensively in this strand of the literature to explore how political institutions affect differences in welfare state coverage. 2 Huber et al. (1993) were the first to find a strong effect of constitutional structure on welfare state effort. One of the main focuses of their work was on the degree to which special interests or veto players can block or delay legislation. In a more recent paper, Iversen and Soskice (2006) argue that central parties are likely to form a coalition with left-wing parties in proportional representation systems, implying more redistribution, while in majoritarian systems central parties are expected to join the right for coalition partners, meaning lower redistribution. A central result of their paper is that countries with proportional representation systems redistribute more than countries with majoritarian systems. They also found that the number of constitutional veto points tends to reduce the degree of income redistribution. 3 The implication of this result is that the constitutional text has more than a declarative role in the development of the welfare state.
While constitutional structure has been used to analyze the impact of political institutions, the constitutional text regarding social security rights is almost completely overlooked. That is probably because of a lack of comparative data on the degree of constitutional commitment to social rights. In order to examine the effect of constitutional rights on redistribution policy we have constructed new indices of the degree of constitutional commitment to seven features of social security.
The goal of this paper is to explore whether the constitutional text regarding social security rights plays a role in shaping social security policy. Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) found a positive relationship between the degree of constitutional commitment to social security and transfer payments. However, that positive association should be seen as a reduced form result. The current study examines the channel through which social rights impact social expenditures, i. e., the laws that specify the social programs, the entitled populations, and their coverage. We study here whether social security rights have an effect on actual measures of social security laws.
A society's preferences are expected to shape social policy and one possible political mechanism is to express those preferences in a country's constitution. Most countries include the first generation of rights in their constitution (civic and political rights), but they differ significantly in the scope and degree of commitment to social rights. In some countries there is not even a mention of social rights in the constitution.
Whatever pressures are exerted on redistribution policy, they are filtered through the constitutional text. The capacity of a government to change social policy is affected by the degree of constitutional commitment to social rights and whether that commitment is binding in practice. The constitution may function as a mere statement of social preferences, or it may work as a guardian of those preferences. 4 In a heterogeneous society, a gap between social rights that have been entrenched in the past and the current desired social policy is likely to emerge over time. Given such a gap, the current decision makers, that represent certain group(s), may decide to comply with the constitution in spite of that gap to avoid future retaliation by other social groups when they assume political power. Due to this tit-for-tat strategy, we expect to find positive relations between constitutional social rights and social security policy. That relation depends also on the balance of power between the executive, the judiciary system, domestic institutions and international organizations. While constitutional veto points may grant small groups or special interests a legal device to block redistributive legislation, constitutional social rights might play the opposite role and make it harder to consolidate welfare expenditures. 5 The two main contributions of this paper are the following. First, we find that constitutionally enumerated social security rights may account (partially) for the observed cross-country variation in social security policy. Second, our analysis contributes to the empirical literature on the efficacy of de jure constitutional rights. While this literature examines the effectiveness of entrenching human rights in the constitution on the observed rights in practice, 6 our paper focuses on the effects of constitutional social security rights on actual social security policy.
In the next section we present a conceptual framework that sketches the relationship between constitutional social rights and welfare policy, and in the subsequent section we describe the criteria used to translate the constitutional text into quantitative indices that reflect an individual nation's constitutional commitment to social security. In Section 4 we look at the effect of constitutional text on the extent and coverage of social security laws. Section 5 concludes the paper.
A conceptual framework: why might the constitution matter
This section presents a conceptual framework that may help to clarify the conditions under which the entrenchment of social rights in a constitution affects social policy in practice. The analysis here is based on cost/benefit considerations that an executive branch may have while deciding on whether economic and social policy should be consistent with the constitutional commitment to social rights. The preferences of voters and countries may differ regarding the desired level of social security, and those differences may be translated into various levels of constitutional commitment to social security rights.
5 In fact, Jensen (2009) shows that the degree of sudden changes in welfare policy depends partly on the institutional friction in a given country. 6 The general picture that emerges from this literature is that de jure human rights are ineffective against state repression (Pritchard 1986; Blasi and Cingranelli 1996; Davenport, 1996; Cross 1999; Keith 2002; Keith et al., 2009; Powel and Staton, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al. 2011) . In contrast, recently Melton (2012) has shown that entrenching a human right in the constitution can significantly improve the likelihood that a country will comply with that right in practice. See also Law and Versteeg (2013) who documented the prevalence of constitutional noncompliance around the world over the last three decades.
It is more likely that those societies which attribute higher value to social equality/insurance considerations would tend to take more risks associated with the entrenchment of social rights in the constitution while others would prefer to exclude those rights from their constitutions. Countries that choose to include social rights in their constitution may favor a general statement that expresses their genuine hopes and aspirations with respect to the desired level of social security. In contrast to political and civil rights, the constitution might state explicitly that social rights should be within the limits of its economic capacity and development.
The alternative model of social rights entrenchment is the pragmatic model, according to which the inclusion of social rights in the constitution in concrete terms is considered to be a tool to shape social and economic policy in practice. 7 The expectation is that constitutional social rights would be perceived as a moral guide for policy makers in the conduct of present and, more importantly, future social policy. According to this constitutional model, the role of the constitution is to limit the capacity of future governments to make significant changes in social programs that are not in line with central values based on a bare and transient majority.
The underlying assumption of both the pragmatic and (to a lesser extent) symbolic models is that policy makers will comply with the constitutional text even if there is a gap between the desired economic policy and the constitution. In a heterogeneous society, the desired redistribution policy is inherently unstable, and this instability may be translated into frequent shifts in political power.
8 Therefore, the more fragmented the society is, the higher the probability of a gap between social rights that have been entrenched in the past and the current desired social policy. This potential gap between political power and the desired social policy is particular to social rights. Given such a gap, decision makers may follow one of three policy options: compliance, noncompliance or a change of the constitution. The current policy makers, representing certain social groups, may choose to comply with the constitution in spite of that gap in order to avoid future retaliation by other social groups when they assume political power. As explained in Ordeshook (1992) , the likelihood of use of a tit-for-tat strategy that may yield a mutually desired equilibrium (compliance with the constitution) is increased by publicizing the constitutional limits. The specified social rights provide concrete 7 We follow here the typology used by Sunstein (2005) who explains why the American constitution lacks social rights. 8 We recommend reading the section on redistributive politics in Ordeshook (1992) which elaborates on the expected unstable outcome.
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standards against which social policy can be assessed by other parties. The potential retaliation, in cases where the current ruling power has deviated from the constitutional limits (i. e., social rights), works as a self-generating incentive to comply. Thus, the constitution serves as a coordination device, as suggested by Hardin (1989) , Przeworski (1991) , Ordeshook (1992) , Weingast (1997) , Carey (2000) , and Elkins et al. (2009) .
We should expect positive relationships between social security rights in the constitution and social security policy if indeed the constitution works as a coordination device. This is our central testable hypothesis. However, it is an open empirical question that will be addressed in the empirical section whether the degree of constitutional commitment to social security rights or the mere existence of social rights in the constitution plays a role in explaining the variation in social security policy around the world. While the first should lead to a linear effect, the latter implies a nonlinear impact.
In addition, the likelihood of compliance or noncompliance depends on the actual balance of power between the executive, the judiciary system, domestic institutions and international organizations. Unlike negative rights, such as the freedom of expression, it is less clear what constitutes noncompliance with regard to constitutional commitment to social rights. The question of who is granted the authority to interpret the constitution becomes very important with greater ambiguity. Policy makers would be more reluctant to deviate from the constitution if they expected that this inconsistency would likely be brought to court. We hypothesize that the positive relations between de jure social rights and actual social policy would be enhanced by constitutional review.
To avoid the risk of shifting the decision making from the executive to the courts, some countries rule out judicial review. The potential large budgetary implications and the uncertainty of what constitutes a constitutional violation are two unique features of social rights that generate such risk. For example, an additional significant budget dedicated to one activity (for example, health) as a result of a court order must come at the expense of other items (for example, law and order) or be financed by a rise in taxes.
In the absence of constitutional review, the incentives for the executive to deviate from the constitution depend more heavily on local non-governmental organizations and international institutions to the extent that they are respected by the general public.
9 These institutions need the help of a free press to provide public coverage in the event of any alleged inconsistency between policy and the written constitution. We expect that the stronger these organizations are, the higher the expected positive correlation between social security rights and social policy.
In addition to compliance and noncompliance, policy makers may choose to amend the constitution to accommodate a shift in social preferences (or politicians' interests). The odds of this policy choice increase the lower are the political costs of constitution amendment. Therefore, we expect a larger positive correlation between social policy and constitutional commitment to social security rights if the costs of amendment are low.
To summarize, the likelihood of effective constitutional social rights is positively related to the degree of judicial independence, the ease of amendment and the power of NGOs and international organizations. In our empirical analysis we also test the previous three hypotheses by incorporating interactions between the above variables and constitutional commitment to social security rights. The actual extent and coverage of social security in practice depends on other important factors that were alluded to in the introduction, such as the level of economic development, demographic composition, and political orientation and institutions. A constitutional social security right is defined as one that gives a personal entitlement to financial benefits and such right may impact individuals' welfare.
10 From Section 3 in the English Human Rights Act it can be inferred that ordinary laws are subject to the Human Rights Act. Any law should be examined in the light of the Human Rights Act. In case a suggested law is in contradiction to the Human Rights Act, the law may still be passed, provided the parliament is aware of this.
Social security rights aim to provide social insurance and may have a positive effect on income inequality. We cover here seven constitutional rights related to social security policy where the first three represent core social security programs: 1. Old Age 2. Survivors of deceased workers 3. Disability 4. The right to live in dignity, usually expressed by income support to the poor 5. Unemployment insurance 6. Sickness insurance 7. Work injury insurance There is sizeable variation in the degree of constitutional commitment to social security rights, ranging from detailed policy instructions in certain countries to a general statement indicating a fuzzy commitment in others. We rank the degree of constitutional commitment for each feature of social security on a scale from 0 to 3, with a rank of 0 denoting a right that is absent from the constitution.
A rank of 1 is set if the constitution contains a general statement regarding a certain social security right. In such cases it is clear that it is possible to introduce a law concerning that right. A country is given a rank of 2 if the constitution promises a minimal level with wording like "a minimum standard of living," or "a life of dignity," in the case of income support and "adequate insurance" in the case of unemployment. A score of 3 is given if the constitution specifies a detailed social security right. For example, a commitment "to maintain the real value" of social security benefits justifies a rank of 3 (Table 1 ). 
rank
The right is absent from the constitution  General statement The state "guarantees" or "promotes" social security insurance, or "every person is entitled to social security"


Weak commitment
Old aged, disabled and survivors are entitled to a "minimum standard of living," "basic income," "adequate income" or "to live in dignity"

Strong commitment
In addition to the guarantee of "adequate income," the constitution specifies the elements of what is adequate income in terms of food, housing etc., or a periodic adjustment mechanism such as COLA.

We employ two summary measures to represent the degree of constitutional commitment to social security. First, a simple average of the seven features of social security rights, and second a subset of the three core characteristics of social security: a simple average rank of Old Age, Survivors and Disability (OASDI). The constitutional commitment to all social security rights was ranked according to these criteria and the dataset for each characteristic is presented in Table 2 . We use the two most common constitutional social security rights -the right to a pension in old age and the right to unemployment insurance -to illustrate the ranking process.
The right to old age, survivors and disability insurance (OASDI)
Each of the three features constituting the right to OASDI was ranked as shown in Table 1 . The overall rank is a simple average across all three features. The most popular rights are old age pensions (41 countries), and assistance to the disabled (39 countries), while support to survivors is less frequent (28 countries).
We use the constitution of Switzerland as an example of a country that receives a rank of 3 as regards OASDI rights. To quote the Swiss constitution: "The confederation shall take measures for adequate social security for the elderly, survivors, and disabled persons. The insurance shall be mandatory. The pensions must cover basic living expenses appropriately. The maximal pension shall not exceed twice the minimal pension. The pension shall at least be adapted to the development of prices." The key elements that are responsible for its high rank are: the insurance is mandatory, there are limits on minimal amounts, and the pension is adjusted to prices.
The constitution of Italy guarantees support to only two of the groups usually included in OASDI (the elderly and the disabled), as may be seen from the following quote: "Workers shall be entitled to adequate insurance for their needs in case of accident, illness, disability, old age, and involuntary unemployment." The constitution assures that workers will receive adequate insurance, but it does not mention any further details such as periodic adjustment. Because of this weak commitment it is assigned a rank of 2 for each group covered, but since only two out of three potential groups are covered, the overall rank is 1.333.
India's constitution contains a general statement concerning the two features of the right to OASDI; each of them earns a rank of 1, as is indicated by the following quote: "The state shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement." Introducing the condition within the limits of its economic capacity and development provides the government with wide room to choose almost any welfare policy and that is the reason for the low rank.
CCSS around the world
There is wide variability in constitutional social security rights, ranging from the U.S. and Australia, where social security rights are absent, to Switzerland and Brazil, which have a high constitutional commitment to social security. Almost 50 countries incorporate a constitutional commitment to social security in their constitution with an average score of 0.57. Brazil, Finland, Portugal, and Switzerland, which do not share obvious common features, are the countries with an exceptionally high level of constitutional commitment to social security. The most prevalent social security right in the constitutions is OASDI (at least one feature), which appears in 43 countries, while Work Injury insurance appears in only 11 countries.
At first glance it is hard to find common economic, cultural or other characteristics among countries that share a similar degree of constitutional commitment to social security (Table 2 ). For example, the Scandinavian countries are spread all over the scale. Finland is closer to Latin-American countries, Sweden has the same constitutional commitment as South Korea, while Norway belongs to a group of countries in which social security is absent from the constitution.
The constitution and the extent of social security
This section examines the empirical correlation between our indices of constitutional commitment to social security and the generosity of social security policy. If the constitutional text with respect to social insurance has any practical meaning it should appear in the actual extent and coverage of social security laws.
Methods and empirical analysis
In general, expenditures such as transfer payments are a complex combination of the extent of social security coverage as determined by social security laws and "exogenous variables" such as take-up rate, demographic composition and macroeconomic conditions (aggregate unemployment rate in the case of unemployment expenditures).
That measure may be shaped and affected by the constitutional commitment to social security as well as important factors such as court interpretation in countries with judiciary review and the power of domestic and international organizations. To guide our empirical analysis we use the following structural form model:
where X is a vector of various control variables (including GDP per capita and demographic composition) and CCSS stands for constitutional commitment to social security. Z represents a vector of several factors that might influence the size effect of CCSS on actual social security policy such as judiciary review, NGO power and ease of amendment. This type of econometric model assumes that a measure of actual social security laws is a linear combination of social security rights and exogenous variables. In addition to (1), we could also write the following "reduced form" relations between constitutional commitment to social security and expenditure on transfer payments:
where G is a vector that includes X as well as other variables. The problem with estimating eq.
[2] is that we cannot know the channel or channels through which the constitution affects (if any) social security policy as in eq.
[1].
The key explanatory variable
We use our indices of CCSS that were constructed in the previous section as our key explanatory variables. Our focus here is on exploring the mechanism channel through which CCSS may affect social security policy (eq.
[1]) in addition to estimating the reduced form relations (eq.
[2]). In particular, we are interested in b 2 , which captures the conditional effect of social security rights for countries with Z = 0 and on b 4 , which signifies the interaction effects. We should expect to have a positive association between social security policy indicators and our index of constitutional commitment to social security if the constitutional text has any practical meaning (b 2 + b 4 Z > 0). Unlike civil and political rights, social security rights might be less binding because of the reasons outlined in the conceptual framework, and thus various policies might be consistent with the same constitutional commitment to social security. Thus, the alternative hypothesis is that no relations exist between the constitutional text and welfare policy which may reflect the fact that the constitution has a solely declarative role (b 2 + b 4 Z = 0).
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Using interactions allows us to test whether the effect of constitutional commitment to social rights on the generosity of welfare policy is higher or lower in countries that differ in judicial independence, the ease of amendment, the power of the international environment regarding social rights, and social structure. The incentives of the executive to deviate from the constitution depend on constitutional review, the strength of local NGOs, freedom of the press and international institutions to the extent that they are respected by the general public in addition to the traditional rigidity of the constitution.
The measure of constitutional review that we employ here is taken from Maddex (1995) . That measure takes the value of 2 in case of full constitutional review, 1 for countries with limited review, and zero otherwise. This may capture the likelihood of compliance that increases with the power to review the constitutionality of laws.
12
The power of NGOs that may condition the effect of constitutional commitment to social security is based on the international NGO Network score for the year 1998 that was introduced by Hughes et al. (2009) and measures the connectedness of local NGOs to the world polity. The score ranges between 0 (low connectedness) and 1 (high connectedness).
The effect of constitutional commitment to social security on public policy depends also on the freedom of the press. The press is an important mediator in revealing inconsistency between policy and the written constitution and thus we expect that countries with a free press would be more likely to show positive correlation between social security rights and social policy. We use the average numerical rankings of the Freedom of the Press index, which is based on an annual survey of media independence done by Freedom House in a cross section 11 In fact, b 2 could also be negative (a cynical constitution), which means that the constitutional text reflects the very opposite of the true beliefs that determine welfare policy. In such cynical regimes the constitutional text serves a propaganda purpose. 12 The results remain the same using other measure of constitutional review taken from Gutmann, Hayo and Voigt (2013) . We thank Jerg Gutmann for sending us the data on constitutional review index for 2005. Following Powell and Staton (2009), we employ also a measure of judicial independence based on Cingranelli and Richards (2008) for the years 1990-1999. This is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the judiciary is partially independent or generally independent and zero if not independent. We thank Jeffrey Staton and Emilia Powell for providing us with data on five measures of judicial independence including those of Howard and Carey (2003) and Tate and Keith (2007) . For space consideration, we report on Cingranelli and Richards' measure only. of countries. We calculated the average numerical rankings for the years 1993-1999 (0-30 = "Not Free"; 31-60 = "Partly Free" and 61-100 = "Free").
It is very difficult to find a convincing indicator for the ease of amendment. Nevertheless, the length of the constitution as measured by the number of words is used here as a proxy for the ease of amendment or adaptability as suggested by Elkins et al. (2009) . 13 Given the findings of Berkovwitz and Clay (2005) on the higher likelihood of endurance of shorter constitutions in states, the constitutions are expected to be more flexible in countries with less detailed constitutions. In addition, we employ an indicator for the rigidity of a constitution taken from Maddex (1995) for the most recent year. The scale goes from 1 (if the approval of a majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is required to change the constitution) to 4 (if, in addition, the legislature has to approve the amendment by more than 66 % of votes in both houses of the legislature in two consecutive legislative terms). Our model also includes an interaction of CCSS and a measure of ethnic fractionalization (defined below). The likelihood of compliance is reduced in a more fragmented society. The basic and solid intuition is that ethnic fractionalization increases the probability of a gap between the constitution and the desired policy. In contrast, we are skeptical that the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) treaty has any practical meaning for compliance. We nevertheless include in the model a dummy variable for ratification of the treaty before 2000 (the year is chosen to be consistent with CCSS timing) and its interaction with CCSS. There are seven countries in our sample that had not ratified the ICESCR treaty as of 2000, including the United States and South Africa. Given our sample size, we have added one control variable at a time to the baseline estimated model.
The dependent variables
It is difficult to find one single variable that represents accurately the degree of social security generosity. Therefore, we use four different measures of social security policy to examine the relationship between constitutional commitment to social security and welfare policy where each measure may capture a different dimension of the actual extent of social security. Our first dependent variable is the share of actual spending on transfer payments relative to GDP in the '1990s.
14 Using transfer payments as a dependent 13 Elkins et al. (2009) use other measures for the ease of amendment but they seem to us even less persuasive. 14 This is a similar model as in Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) .
variable captures the actual outlays and also should be seen as a reduced form association between social rights and social security policy (eq.
[2]).
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The three other measures allow us to focus on the channel through which social rights may impact social expenditures, i. e., the laws that specify the social programs, the entitled populations and its coverage. If the constitution does have an effect on welfare policy, this should be first translated into a positive connection between the degree of commitment to social security in the constitution and the extent and coverage of social security laws. That might be seen more as a structural estimation of the effect of constitutional commitment to social security on the extent and coverage of social security laws, which complements the reduced form estimation.
The empirical challenge to exploring such a channel is to construct a meaningful index that captures the extent and coverage of social security laws. Note that the generosity of social security laws may be related to the size of the eligible population, perhaps taking account of demographic factors, such as age distribution, ethnic composition, and the percentage of the eligible population in the total population. Social entitlements may be more generous with a larger eligible population because of political considerations through a median voter effect, or less generous due to budget considerations.
In estimating eq.
[1], we have employed three additional different dependent variables to capture the actual extent and coverage of social security. The second dependent variable is a measure of social security coverage that has been constructed by Botero et al. (2004) for 85 countries. Most social security programs are formulated as entitlements, a fact that helps to quantify the extent and coverage of social security programs in a relatively meaningful way. We use their summary index of social security coverage instead of transfer payments as a proxy for social security coverage (52 countries exist both in their and our samples).
That indicator has certain advantages over actual public spending on redistribution policy. It is less sensitive to cross country differences in macroeconomic conditions (unemployment), demographic composition (elderly population), and take-up rates of social benefits. 16 It is important to the extent that the error term is correlated with the omitted variables, as the coefficient of CCSS is biased if we do not control for all of the relevant factors.
15 Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) found a positive relationship between the degree of constitutional commitment to social security and transfer payments (as a share of GDP).
16 Several papers have also worked with the difference between gross income inequality (pre tax-transfers) and net income inequality (post tax-transfer). We do not employ that indicator because of data limitations. The data on the reduction of income inequality as a result of government intervention is available mainly for developed countries.
Moreover, transfer payments include social security expenditures in addition to other government transfers. International institutions that collect and publish budgetary data are always careful to add footnotes regarding the limitations of comparing fiscal data across countries. In fact, we found large discrepancies between various sources in the data on actual social security expenditures or transfer payments.
The third dependent variable is the contribution rate made by employers and workers as a percentage of earnings (payroll tax rate) to all social security programs (taken from Social Security Throughout the World 2004). The contribution rate as an indicator for the extent and coverage of social security programs might be more comparable across countries than transfer payments. Nonetheless, the limitation of that proxy is clear: social security benefits may be more generous than what is implied by the contribution rate in countries that have experienced long and substantial actuarial deficits. However, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004) report a relatively large correlation between the amount of revenue collected by payroll taxes and social security expenditures.
The fourth dependent variable is the contribution rate for OASDI, which represents core social security programs. The disaggregated social security rights that are constructed here allow us to explore the effect of core social security rights, in addition to all rights, on core social policy. Naturally, the constitutional commitment to a particular right must be examined in terms of the associated social security law and therefore we should replace our key explanatory variable (i. e., summary index of social security rights) by a subset indicator of core social security rights (constitutional commitment to OASDI). This type of detailed examination provides a more stringent test of the importance of constitutional rights on social policy.
The control variables
We estimate the effect of constitutional commitment to social security on welfare policy, controlling for a list of control variables. The most common control variables are GDP per capita and demographic composition. 17 These two variables encapsulate the Logic of Industrialism approach (Wilensky, 1975) . Therefore our baseline statistical model includes, in addition to CCSS, these two control variables.
We use the average share of the population over age 65 for years 1990-1999 (taken from the World Bank Database on World Development Indicators) to capture the fact that a large share of social security expenditure goes to that age group. The data for GDP per capita is an average for 1990-1999 taken from the Penn World Tables (the data are not available for Taiwan) . Income per capita serves as an indicator of the level of economic development, which may affect preferences for public expenditure, as well as a more advanced tax-collection system.
We test other control variables to allow for competing theories such as Power Resources and political institutions (as mentioned above) to explain the cross country variation in welfare policy. The first additional control variable is a measure of political orientation for the years 1990-1999 (an average). This variable ranges from 1 to 3 where 1, 2 and 3 represent "Right," "Center," and "Left," respectively. Following Korpi (1983) and others, we expect that countries with leftist government would tend to redistribute more, other things being equal. We use also a political system indicator that assigns a value of 1 to a country with a parliamentary system in 1998, and zero otherwise. It is more likely that a country with a parliamentary system would lead to a more generous welfare system (See Iversen and Soskice, 2006) . The data for the two above political indicators are taken from the World Bank Database on Political Institutions.
The well-known indicator of ethnic fractionalization is also tested as a control variable. The measure of ethnic fractionalization is defined as the likelihood of selecting two individuals with different ethnicities when drawing randomly from the general population (taken from Alesina, 2003) . Following Alesina (2003) and others, we expect a less generous welfare system in countries with a higher degree of ethnic fractionalization.
Results
Before turning to regression results, Table 3 presents a simple matrix for four different features of social security: Old age, Unemployment, Work Injury, and Sickness. The rows describe whether a particular feature exists in the constitution (regardless of its degree of commitment), and the columns represent whether that same feature appears in the regular laws as they are documented in Social Security Throughout the World 2004.
Panels A and C of Table 3 show that Old Age (including survivors and disability) and Work Injury laws exist in all countries. Those countries that have not mentioned Old Age (25 countries in our sample) and Work Injury (57 countries in our sample) in their constitution still provide these social insurance features. This simple matrix implies that the lack of constitutional commitment to a certain social security feature is not translated to an absence of that particular feature from social security law.
The other off-diagonal cells in four panels of Table 3 are even more interesting. They answer the question of whether there are countries that have expressed commitment to particular features of social security and yet do not provide coverage at all. We find five such countries in the case of Unemployment and two countries in the case of Sickness. However, it is hard to draw conclusions from this finding due to data limitations. Unfortunately, the Social Security Throughout the World publication pooled together countries that do not have a particular feature of social security with countries for which the data are unavailable.
It seems that the mere existence of social security laws is not related to their absence or presence in the constitution. However, the main goal of this paper is to Constitutional Commitment examine whether those countries that do include social rights in their constitution are different in terms of generosity of social security laws from those who do not, and within the group of countries that have social security rights in their constitutions, if countries with higher degrees of constitutional commitment to social security are also more generous as expressed by social security laws. Table 4 presents our baseline results for four various indices of the generosity of social security. In the first column we provide the reduced form estimation, which replicates the Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) regression. The summary index of constitutional commitment to social security was found to be positively associated with the share of transfer payments in GDP. The estimated coefficient reflects a substantial quantitative effect. An increase of one standard deviation in the constitutional commitment to social security would induce a rise of 1.8 percentage points in the share of transfers in GDP if this correlation reflects a causal relationship. Note that the coefficient of CCSS is positive and significant (at 5 %), even when countries with a rank of 3 on the constitutional commitment index are excluded (not reported here). Notes: CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-3 and core index in column 4. The variable CCSS is measured according to ranking procedure that is explained in the text. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
As expected, the effect of the share of the population over age 65 on transfer payments is positive and significant. We do not find a significant impact of GDP per capita on transfer payments but this result is sensitive to the inclusion of elderly population variables. The coefficient of GDP per capita becomes positive and significant when the share of the population over age 65 is not included. These results reflect the positive and high correlation (0.79) between the share of the population over age 65 and GDP per capita. This correlation implies that the share of elderly population may also serve as proxy for the level of economic development.
In the second column we use as our dependent variable an index of social security coverage that was constructed by Botero et al. (2004) for 85 countries. The coefficient of constitutional commitment to social security is again positive, but it is not significant at an acceptable level. In columns 3 and 4 (Table 4) we run regressions in which the dependent variables are the contribution rates both for all social security programs and for core social security activities (taken from Social Security Throughout the World 2004). The coefficient of constitutional commitment to social security implies a positive effect on the social security contribution rate. However, it becomes significant at the 10 percent level when the contribution rate on core social security activity is used.
We rerun all of the regressions allowing for a non-linear effect of CCSS using ordinal coding of the CCSS variable with three categories for none (CCSS = 0), minimal (0 < CCSS ≤ 1), and maximal (1 < CCSS ≤ 3) and the general picture that emerges is essentially the same. The results show that the positive impact of CCSS on the share of transfer payments in GDP is significant only when CCSS is greater than one (Table 5 ). This finding is consistent with the pragmatic model according to which the constitution should matter if social rights are written in concrete terms. However, the positive effect of CCSS on the other three measures of social security laws is significant both for countries with minimal and with strong constitutional commitments to social security rights (Table 5 ). This result suggests that both the symbolic and pragmatic models outlined in Section 2 affect social policy in practice.
Given that the CCSS variable is essentially bi-modal, as many countries (26) have not included social security rights in their constitution or have only a minimal constitutional guarantee of social security (29 countries) and only a few countries (11) have a strong commitment, it is important to test the sensitivity of our results to our choice of coding CCSS. The binary summary index of constitutional commitment to social security was found to be positively associated with all three measures of social security laws (Table 6) . Interestingly, the effect of CCSS on the actual share of transfer payments in GDP is still positive, but it is not significant anymore at an acceptable level.
Thus, while the sign of our key coefficient is robust to the choice of coding, the degree of significance is sensitive to the chosen dimension of social security extensiveness. The ambiguity regarding the policy implications of constitutional social rights could be one possible justification to favor binary coding. Policy makers are less likely to overlook CCSS completely but they have more room to choose the level of social policy generosity regardless of the (positive) level of constitutional commitment in cases where there is a lack of clarity regarding the concrete meaning of constitutional social rights. While it is easy to check whether a country has unemployment insurance, it is far harder to find a yardstick to measure whether the level of generosity of unemployment benefits is in line with the constitutional commitment to such a right. In the following sections we use a binary coding of CCSS (instead of the original scale) to keep the interpretation of the results relatively simple and comparable. 
Notes: CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-3 and core index in column 4. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
The endogeneity problem
The positive coefficient we found may not reflect causal relations because unobserved social preferences may shape both constitutional social rights and social policy. While we could not rule out the potential risk of endogeneity, there are several reasons to believe that the danger of endogeneity is lower in our case. First, there is an inherent time lag between the timing of the writing of constitutional social rights, which may represent mostly past preferences, and the current social policy that is influenced by current social priorities. Some countries have not made any changes in social rights for decades or even centuries, as is the case in the United States, while others have made significant modifications throughout their history. Nevertheless, one possible direction for future research is to construct panel data sets on constitutional social rights, which might serve to further elucidate the reason for changing the scope and efficacy of social rights.
Second, the risk of endogeneity arises if there is a systematic bias in the sense that countries that provide more generous social policy tend to include Table 6 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (Binary CCSS).
Social Security Laws Index (Botero et al.) Contribution Rate (All programs) Contribution Rate (OASDI programs)
Notes: CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-3 and core index in column 4. The variable CCSS is a dummy that take the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
Constitutional Commitment social rights in the constitution. However, it could be that social policy in some countries is shaped by social preferences that are not (yet) in the constitution and may never be. Third, the social rights that are included in the constitution could be just the opposite of the true social preferences that dictate government policy. In those cynical regimes the constitution is merely of propaganda value. Thus, the potential omission of an important variable such as social preferences or norms should necessarily lead to positive relations as has been found in our empirical analysis.
Interaction effects
As suggested in the conceptual framework, the effectiveness of constitutional social rights depends on the strength of several political and social institutions such as the degree of constitutional review, the ease of amendment and the power of NGOs and international organizations, in addition to ethnic fractionalization. We test these effects by incorporating interactions between the above institutional characteristics and our index of constitutional commitment to social security rights. Table 7 displays the results of regressions that include an index of constitutional review. In addition to our baseline model we add an interaction term to capture the potential impact of judicial review on the compliance with constitutional commitment to social security rights. The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant, which implies that the effect of CCSS on the actual social security coverage is not affected by the degree of constitutional review. We find similar results using other measures of judicial review and judicial independence (not reported here). It might be that those measures do not represent the true power of the judiciary system with respect to social rights.
The same general picture emerges when testing the potential effect on the coefficient of CCSS of ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) treaty, as well as the international connectedness of local NGOs to the world polity. The coefficient of the interaction between CCSS and ICESCR came out as insignificant (Table 8 ). The interaction effect between CCSS and NGOs is also not significant (Table 9) . We find the same result for the interaction of freedom of the press and constitutional commitment to social security (Table 10) .
The interaction of the length of the constitution and CCSS is not significant (Table 11) , while the coefficients of CCSS keep their sign and significance (except for the social security coverage index). We should be cautious in interpreting the effect of the interaction term in light of our doubts regarding the length in words Table 7 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (with political orientation, political institutions and ethnic fractionalization).
Transfer Payments (% GDP) Social Security Laws Index The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The sum of main and interaction effects represents the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Ethnic Fractionalization. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %. Table 8 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (with judicial independence interaction).
The dependent variable
Transfer Payments (% GDP) Social Security Laws Index (Botero et al.) .
Contribution Rate ( The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The measure Judicial Independence is according to Cingranelli and Richards (2008) . The sum of main and interaction effects represents the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Judicial Independence. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %. Table 9 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (with Ratification of ICESCR interaction).
Transfer Payments (% GDP) Social Security Laws Index The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for Ratification of ICESCR refers to ratification prior to the year 2000. Countries that ratified the ICESCR after 2000 were assigned a value of 0 (Indonesia, Bahrain, Turkey and China). The sum of main and interaction effects represents the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Ratification of ICESCR. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
Constitutional Commitment Table 10 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (with Length of Constitution interaction).
Transfer Payments (% GDP) Social Security Laws Index (Botero et al.) Contribution Rate ( The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The length of constitution is measured in words divided by 10,000. The sum of main and interaction effects represents the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Length of Constitution. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %. Table 11 : Generosity of social security laws and constitutional commitment to social security (With interaction between CCSS and Length of Constitution).
The dependent variable The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that take the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The length of constitution is measured in words divided by 10,000. The sum of main and interaction effects present the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Length of Constitution. The t statistics are reported in the parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
as a good indicator for the degree of flexibility of the constitution. Moreover, the length is a defendable proxy to the extent that compliance is more likely under durable constitutions. We also employ Maddex's index of constitutional rigidity, given the disagreement regarding the length of the constitution as a reliable indicator of constitutional flexibility. The results are generally the same with that alternative measure of rigidity (not reported). Next, we test whether the effect of CCSS is smaller in more fragmented societies. As can be seen, the coefficient of CCSS is positive in all specifications but significant, as before, in three out of four measures of social security coverage. Also, the sign and significance of GDP per capita and demographic composition are not affected by the inclusion of these three control variables. In contrast, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant (Table 12 ).
In Table 12 we add three important control variables to our baseline specification that represent political institutions and social structure. The coefficients of political orientation and the parliamentary system are not significant, while the coefficient of ethnic fractionalization is significant only when the dependent variable is the contribution rate to core social security programs. Its sign is negative, as expected.
The general picture that emerges from Tables 7-12 is that the magnitude of the estimated impact of CCSS on social security coverage is not affected significantly by the various institutional characteristics, which is not in line with the theoretical prediction. However, the marginal effect of CCSS (at the mean) is still significant except in the case of transfer payments as the dependent variable (as before). Note that an F test shows that the sum of coefficients of CCSS and the interaction term is positive and significant in all six tables (the bottom rows). Thus, the positive effect of constitutional commitment to social security on actual social security coverage is very robust, which is consistent with the main hypothesis of the conceptual framework.
Sensitivity analysis
The various models presented in Section 2 are based on the assumption of a democratic society, in which leaders are more accountable than in undemocratic countries such as Syria or Iran. We have rerun our regressions excluding countries that were classified by Freedom House in the year 2003 as not free (the countries that were excluded are Syria, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Cameroon and China). As can be seen from Table 13 , the coefficients of CCSS remain positive and significant with the limited sample of free or partly free countries. The variable CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-6 and core index in column 7-8. CCSS is a dummy that take the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The sum of main and interaction effects present the estimated marginal effect of CCSS on the dependent variable at the mean value of Ethnic Fractionalization. The t statistics are reported in the parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
As we have mentioned, Persson and Tabellini (2004) explore the effect of electoral rules and forms of governments on the size of government. In their Table 4 , they had investigated the impact of these two political dimensions on the generosity of welfare payments. In Table 14 we test whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of all PT's covariates (majoritarian system and presidential executive). The estimated effect of constitutional commitment to social security survives this test.
Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed for 68 countries seven indices of constitutional commitment to social security rights: Old Age, Survivors, Disability, Unemployment, Sickness, and Work Injury insurance, and Income Support. The new detailed data on constitutional social security rights can be used in future research on the welfare state. A commitment to OASDI appears in the constitution of 43 countries while only 11 countries have a constitutional commitment to Work Injury insurance. Twenty-one countries preferred not to include any social security rights in their constitutional text, but nevertheless in practice they do provide social security. In general, in countries that have social security rights in their constitutions the degree of commitment is relatively low; some countries lower it further by adding that those rights should be in accordance with the law. This may reflect the fear that constitutional commitment might undermine the flexibility of economic policy to adjust to environment changes such as macroeconomic fluctuations or preferences toward government involvement. Notes: CCSS stands for our summary index in columns 1-3 and core index in column 4. The variable CCSS is a dummy that take the value of one if a country includes social security rights in its constitution and zero otherwise. The dummy variables for Majoritarian Countries and Presidential Executive are according to the Database of Political Institutions and refer to the year 1998. The t statistics are reported in the parentheses. *** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5 %; * Significant at 10 %.
Constitutional Commitment
Our work suggests that the chosen indicator to represent the generosity of welfare states can influence the results on the big question of why some countries redistribute more than others. In general, we find a positive effect for all four measures of social security policy with respect to constitutional protections of that security, but the significance of their coefficients is sensitive to the chosen coding of CCSS. The impact of CCSS on the actual share of expenditure on transfer payments is significant only when we use the original scaling of social security rights, but it becomes insignificant with binary coding. The reverse is true for the other three different indexes for the coverage of social security.
We have found significant coefficients for CCSS with social security contribution rates and social security coverage index as independent variables. The ambiguity regarding the policy implications of constitutional social rights could be one possible explanation for the success of binary coding. Policy makers are less likely to overlook CCSS completely, but they have more room to choose the level of social policy generosity regardless of the (positive) level of constitutional commitment.
These results imply a positive connection between the degree of commitment to social security in the constitution and the extent and coverage of social security laws. It provides support for the hypothesis that the constitutional text is meaningful for social security policy.
It is not clear why the more structural estimation does not generate the same results as the reduced form estimation. The data that we have used are a natural candidate to explain that discrepancy. The contribution rates and the index of social security coverage we have borrowed from Botero et al. (2004) may capture different features of the extent of social security laws.
The general picture that emerges from the findings of this paper is that while the translation of social rights such as social security may be expressed by various levels of generosity, the degree of constitutional commitment does have practical implications for social security policy. Thus, constitutional commitment to social rights seems to play a role in explaining the large variation in welfare state coverage around the world.
